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The Course is aimed at providing a detailed picture of 
the state of non-destructive assay of fissile material 
to-day. 
The majority of the time will be spent in "hands-on" 
laboratory experiments in small groups. The experi-
ments are designed to illustrate basic nuclear measure· 
ment theory and specific practical measurement pro-
blems. The course will include gamma-ray measure-
ment experiments (e.g. U-enrichment, Pu isotopic com-
position, GeLi detector systems, etc.) as well as neutron 
experiments (coincidence counting, active interrogation, 
etc.). Emphasis will be placed on individual participa· 
tion and discussion of the attendees specific problems. 
Registration fee: Lit. 160.000 
For further information please contact: 
Secretariat "Ispra.Courses" 
Centro EURATOM 
I· 21020 ISPRA (Varese) 
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COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
JOINT RESEARCH CENTRE 
CALL FOR PAPERS 
1st SYMPOSIUM ON SAFEGUARDS AND NUCLEAR MATERIAL MANAGEMENT 
APRIL 25-26, 1979 
The first annual symposium sponsored by ESARDA on Safeguards and Nuclear Material Manage-
ment will be held in the Ravenstein Congress Hall in Brussels, Bel_gium. 
The purpose of the meeting is to stimulate discussion about safeguards implementation problems in 
the European Community between nuclear plant operators, safeguards authorities and research 
organizations. 
The JOINT RESEARCH CENTRE of the Commission of the European Communities will be respon-
sible for the organization of the Symposium. 
Original papers will be welcome from nuclear plant operators, safeguards authorities and research 
organizations of all countries on the following subjects: 
• Safeguards concepts and regulations 
• System analysis 
• Nondestructive assay methods and instruments 
• Destructive analysis 
• Physical standards (reference materials) and normalization samples 
• Interlaboratory tests 
• Containment and surveillance 
• Data recording, processing and reporting in nuclear installations 
• Isotopic correlations 
• Statistical methods for nuclear safeguards 
Contributions have to be written in one of the following languages: Danish, Dutch, English, French, 
German, Italian. An abstract in English should always be provided. Simultaneous translation will be 
organized at the symposium. 
Both a 50 word abstract in English. and a 500 word summary must reach the scientific secretariat 
not later than December 10, 1978. It will greatly assist the Commiteeifthesummaryisalso in English. 
Papers will be selected by an international committee. 
Final manuscripts will be required at the time of the conference. 
Registration forms, programmes and additional information on the symposium will be distributed 
later. A copy of the proceedings of the symposium will be sent to the participants. 
An instrument exhibition is being organized together with the symposium. 
The organizers would like to be informed in advance by the people planning to attend this 
symposium with or without contributing a paper, so that official programmes can be distributed 
beforehand. 
Please write to the scientific secretariat of the symposium: 
A.S. Adamson, NMACT, AERE HARWELL, Didcot OXON, OX11 ORA, England 
C. Beets, CEN/SCK, B-2400 Moi/Donk, Belgium 
L. Stanchi, JRC, 21020 lspra (Varese) Italy 
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A NOTE ON PARTICULAR SAFEGUARDS PROVISIONS 
B. LOVE 
EURATOM SAFEGUARDS 
LUXEMBOURG 
Regulation 3227/76 is to be implemented through "Particular Safeguard Provisions". 
These are mentioned in no less than 14 of the 40 Articles of the Regulation, which may be taken 
as an indication of the extent to which the detailed procedures for the application of safeguards 
to any particular installation have been seen to be necessarily tied not only to general principles 
but also to the particular circumstances specific to that plant. This note outlines the various 
aspects which may be covered in the PSP's, and attempts to give some general indication of the 
structure which may be adopted for them. Clearly, since the PSP is to be tailored to the par-
ticular plant, any particular operator may find only a part of what follows to be applicable in his 
case. 
The P.S.P. has its roots in the declarations by the operator of the basic technical charac-
teristics. These declarations should be complete and sufficiently detailed in all significant as-
pects. Only if this is the case can the particular characteristics of the plant be properly taken 
into account in specifying the detailed safeguarding procedures. If this is not the case there is a 
risk that the safeguarding procedures finally specified may be less economical and more burden-
some to the operator then would have resulted from more complete declarations of the informa-
tion on the design and operating characteristics of the plant. 
Article 7 of the Regulation gives a non-exhaustive list of the main procedures to be speci-
fied, after consultation with the operator and the Member State, in the PSP. The main headings 
are: 
a ) the designation of Material Balance Areas, and Key Measurement Points for Flow and 
Inventory, 
b ) the procedures for Records and for Reports for each MBA, 
c ) the frequency and procedures for Physical Inventory Taking, 
d ) containment and surveillance measures, 
e ) sample-taking for safeguard purposes, 
f) communication of operating programmes, 
g ) advance notification of receipts and shipments. 
Article 8 of the Regulation stipulates that the PSP shall be drawn up by means of an 
"individual decision" of the Commission after consultation and that both the operator and the 
Member State will be notified of the decision. It is expected each P.S.P. will take the form of a 
relatively short formal "decision", with the technical content being spelt out in detail in an 
Annex, which will form an integral part of the whole. 
The layout to be adopted for the Annex will, for obvious reasons, have a certain simila-
rity to the layout of the "Facility Attachment" which specifies the corresponding safeguards 
commitments, if any, which the Community has undertaken vis-a-vis the IAEA for implemen-
tation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the particular plant concerned. There are differences, 
however, in that, for example, various descriptive sections of the F/A are not appropriate for in-
clusion in the PSP whereas the effect of certain Community requirements (e.g. provisions for 
accounting by particular safeguard obligation) may require to be specified in the PSP but not 
in the F/A. 
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The normal sequence for the requirements in the P.S.P. is now given, together with oc-
casional explanatory remarks. 
Code 1 - Information on the installations 
1.1 Changes in the basic technical characteristics which require to be notified in ad-
vance. 
1.2 Programme of activities: 
Content and mode of transmission of annual outline programme 
Specific times of Physical Inventory Takings. 
1.3 Conditions requiring advance notification of receipts, shipments or other Inventory 
Changes. 
1.4 Particular requirements for advance notification of imports and exports. 
Code 2 - Material Balance Areas and Key Measurement Points for Flow and for Inventory. 
Code 3 - Records Requirements 
3.1 Accounting records 
3.2 Other specific requirements for accounting records, e.g. time of recording, proce-
dures for accounting for discards, wastes and other IC's, such as New Measurement, 
Nuclear Transformation etc. 
Specification of typical batch descriptions, and relevant source data. These are to 
be specified for each KMP, (F) or (I),and for flow KMP's for each type of inven-
tory change. 
Material Description Codes and Measurement Basis Codes may be specified. The 
specification of source data will generally follow the pattern: 
for bulk material 
in one container : 
for fuel pins, 
for each pin : 
for fuel assemblies, 
for each assembly : 
for rebatching : 
for Shipper/Receiver 
Differences : 
Identification reference, 
Chemical oomposition and physical form of material 
Tare, gross and nett weights 
U-factor and U-total weight 
Pu-factor and Pu-weight 
Enrichment and U-235 weight 
Identification number, 
Pin fabrication data including fuel compound weight 
and U-factor, if fabricated in the particular MBA 
Weight of total uranium in pin 
Weight of enriched uranium, enrichment and U-235 
weight for each separate enrichment. 
Identification number 
Assembly make-up data including fuel compound 
weight and U-factor if assembled in the particular MBA 
Weight of total uranium in assembly 
Weight of enriched uranium, enrichment and U-235 
weight for each separate enrichment. 
Source data for each container before and after rebat-
ching. 
. Source data according to shipper and according to 
receiver. 
3.3 
3.3.1 
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Operating records 
Operating data used to establish changes in the quantity or composition of nuclear 
material. 
3.3.2 Location of each item of inventory at any time. 
3.3.3 Calibration results, including derived estimates of random and systematic errors. 
3.3.4 Actions taken in order to ascertain the cause and extent of any accidental or un-
measured loss. 
Code 4 - Reports Requirements 
4.1 Inventory Change Reports 
4.1.1 Particular provisions concerning non-standard form and format. 
4.1.2 Particular codification arrangements concerning External Obligations. 
4.1.3 Specific procedures to be applied, e.g. 
-at specific MBA's 
- for use declarations 
-for transmission of concise notes 
- for reporting nuclear transformations 
- for reporting isotopic data 
- for grouping at dispatch of small Inventory Changes; such as analytical samples. 
4.1.4 Specific provisions regarding timing or frequency of reports. 
4.2 Physical Inventory Listings 
-Headings similar to those for ICR's. 
4.3 Material Balance Reports 
4.3.1 Particular provisions concerning non-standard form and format 
4.3.2 Categories of nuclear material for which MBR's are to be established 
4.3.3 Timing of reports 
4.4 Special Reports 
Circumstances requiring the establishment of a special report, together with con-
tent and form of report, e.g. 
- loss of nuclear material 
- change in containment 
-interference with surveillance system 
- delay in transport, or other suspicion of possible loss. 
4.5 Initial Inventory. 
Code 5 - Operator's engagements (undertakings/commitments) 
5.1 Physical Inventory Taking 
5.1.1 Frequency and timing 
5.1.2 Procedures 
5.2 Containment devices 
5 .3 Surveillance system 
5.4 Provisions relating to the verification of the operator's measurement system, e.g. 
- Submission of analytical samples for destructive analysis 
- Submission of samples for non-destructive analysis on the operator's instruments 
- Advance notice concerning special calibrations. 
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5.5 Provisions relating to the verification of the quantities of nuclear material, e.g. 
- Sampling for destructive analysis 
- Sampling for non-destructive analysis. 
Code 6 - Financial Provisions 
This may seem all a formidably long list of contents for each PSP, but it reflects a frame-
work into which the safeguarding requirements appropriate to a single plant can be fitted. Con-
sultations with operators have been in progress and will require to continue until PSP's have been 
established for all the installations subject to safeguards in the Community. 
For those operators who are not currently in consultation with the Commission about 
their PSP's, this "breathing space" gives them an opportunity to look again at their Declaration 
. of basic technical characteristics in the light of the use to which it will be put for drafting the 
PSP, and to see whether it includes descriptions of those features of their plant or operating pro-
cedures which they would wish to see reflected in the PSP. Similarly these operators can useful-
ly give thought to the variety of different "typical batch descriptions" and typical Inventory 
Changes which occur in their plant, and assure themselves that the necessary source data are 
being both generated and recorded in an appropriately systematic manner. 
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SAFEGUARDING A FUEL ELEMENT PRODUCTION PLANT 
- the use of an automatic in-line sampling device and measurement system -
GENERAL 
An interesting problem in safeguarding techniques was posed by the need for a method 
for independent verification by Euratom Safeguards of the total quantity of U-235 leaving a fuel 
fabrication line in the form of A VR or THTR fuel spheres. This was solved by the design and 
development of an automatic in-line sampling device, and an associated measurement system, 
which have now been in routine operation for over two years. 
The material to be measured consists of 60 mm diameter graphite spheres, each having a 
central core of SO mm containing a mixture of graphite and graphite-coated particles of highly-
enriched (U, Th) oxides. Each "pebble" contains 0.96 g of 93 %enriched uranium and 9.62 g of 
thorium. 
The finished pebbles are fed directly from the production line at a maximum rate of one 
element every 14 seconds to the shipment drums, which can contain up to 1000 elements. The 
smallest homogeneous production batch is normally composed of 2000 elements. 
A study was first made in the Euratom Safeguards Directorate of the statistical sampling 
effort taking into account the safeguards requirements, the fuel specifications, and the produc-
tion practices. The basic requirements for the apparatus were then established with specialists 
of the Joint Research Centre at Ispra, who carried out the design and development of the equip-
ment. 
Requirements from the operator as well as from the Safeguards Authority, which influ-
enced the choice of the verification system are as follows: 
the system should give the minimum inspection time and effort at the plant; 
no intrusiveness: automatic sampling and measurement should be used, and as far as 
possible on end products; 
no access to the pebbles should be possible after the pebbles have passed the operator's 
quality control and are fed toward the shipping drum, in order to prevent any substitu-
tion of sampled and verified elements by other elements before shipment; 
no alteration of the production rate: for in-line measurement of the U-235 content of 
each individual pebble a fast response and a high level of reliability and automation of the 
apparatus must be reached; 
no damage to the product: the pebbles sampled and measured by the Safeguards Autho-
rity have already passed the final quality control; 
the origin of the selected elements must be retraceable to avoid mixing up the selected 
pebbles when they are fed back to the shipment drums; 
no delay to production or shipment. 
SAMPLING DEVICE 
To meet these specifications, an in-line automatic sampling device (the Fuel Pebble Sam-
pling Device) was designed to be fitted directly on top of the shipment drums. This device had 
to perform the following functions: 
count in a tamperproof way all pebbles for shipment (only a pebble should trigger the 
counter); 
sample pebbles automatically according to a preselectable programme; 
provide containment for all the pebbles that have passed through whether into the ship· 
ping drum or into the sample container. 
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In order to reduce the time of the inspector-presence, it was decided to build ten such 
sampling devices, so that up to 10 shipping drums could be loaded from the production line bet-
ween inspection visits. 
Figure 1 shows one sampling device in use on a shipping drum; other shipping drums 
complete with sampling devices can be seen in the background. 
At an inspection visit for measurement, the 10 sampling tubes are each disconnected by 
the inspector from the FPSD's, and, without any handling of the pebbles, are put in a sample 
tube loading unit on top of the measurement apparatus, which is installed inside the plant. 
MEASUREMENT SYSTEM 
The measurement of the U-235 content of each pebble is based on thermal neutron irra-
diation of a pebble and delayed neutron counting. 
The sample pebbles are released automatically, one at a time, into the irradiation 
facility. In this facility, each sample is irradiated for 60 seconds in a thermal neutron flux of 
5 x 10 5 n/sec.cm 2 , producted by four Cf-252 neutron sources ( 4 x 20 llg) placed in a polythene 
moderator. 
After transfer of the sample by gravity (distance 3m) from the irradiation facility to the 
counting facility (transfer + waiting time = 2 seconds) the delayed neutrons, producted by fis-
sion of the U-235 are counted, after thermalisation, by eight He 3 neutron detectors, for 40 se-
conds. The sample is finally released to the sample unloading unit. While one sample is counted, 
another sample is irradiated. This means that the total analysis time per sample is approximately 
one minute. 
The general layout of the measurement system is shown in fig. 2. Successively from the 
top can be seen: 
(i) the sample tube loading unit and feed mechanism 
(ii) irradiation chamber 
(iii) inclined transfer tube 
(iv) delay chamber 
(v) detection chamber 
(vi) measured sample unloading unit with tube reloader. 
The delayed neutron activity obtained from the sample is compared to a calibration curve 
established using fuel pebbles having a known amount of U-235. 
Due to the small quantity of fissile material present in the sample and to the large quanti-
ty of Th-232 present, a sub-threshold neutron spectrum must be used for the assay of the U-235. 
In order to minimize the error due to the inhomogeneous distribution of the U-Th par-
ticles which may exist within the fuel elements, the irradiation facility was designed to provide 
a neutron flux as nearly constant as possible along the radius of the pebble, by using four Cf 252 
sources, and the delayed neutron response in the counting facility was arranged to be as indepen-
dent as possible of the geometrical position of the U-235 in the fuel element by using eight He 3 
detectors (20 em active length). 
The complete apparatus is designed for the fully automatic analysis of up to 100 samples 
without the intervention of the inspector. Underneath the counting facility a sample unload-
ing unit with 10 tubes (up to 10 elements per tube) is attached. The automatic operation en-
sures that the elements in the unloading unit are in identified positions and in the same sequence 
as they were presented for analysis. This last point is of importance since its permits the return 
of the analysed samples to their correct output drums as was requested by the fabricator. 
\ 
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Figure 1 
Fuel Pebble Sampling Device in use on a Shipping Drum 
(Other Devices mounted on unfilled Shipping Drums are visible in the background) 
\ 
'.--;r 
Figure 2 
Measurement system during development 
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For a more detailed description of the system the interested reader may refer to paper 
SM-201/73, by Cuypers, Van der Stricht, Boursier and Corbelini, presented at the 1975 Safe-
guards Symposium in Vienna. 
PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE 
After the construction and the setting up of the apparatus by the J.R. C., Ispra, the 
Euratom Safeguards Directorate staff have used this safeguards system routinely in inspection 
from January 197 6 onwards. In two years operation, 179,928 pebbles passed through the sam-
pling device and were sampled. Approximately 1 %of them were measured. 
During this period the inspection procedure fulfilled the aims mentioned above. The in-
spector-presence averaged 5 man-days/month. The operator's personnel work-load for prepara-
tion of drums and replacement of pebbles is two days/month. 
No difficulties were experienced with the installed sampling devices and measurement sys-
tem. Hence relations with the plant were always excellent, and this inspection activity is now 
fully accepted as a routine measure. 
Using a spherical container similar in size to a pebble, the measurement system has also 
been used successfully to assay other types of nuclear materials, such as uo2 powder and pellets, 
and U scraps, for uranium-235 content. 
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E. S. A. R. D. A. NEWSLETTER 
In the ESARDA NEWSLETTER contained in the EUROPEAN SAFEGUARDS BULLETIN 
No 1, of Autumn 1976, the working groups of ESARDA were introduced. 
The Steering Committee of ESARDA establishes working groups from time to time to 
carry out specific tasks in a joint manner. Non-members of ESARDA may attend the meetings 
of these groups and contribute actively. The basic objective of these working groups is to inves-
tigate technical problems relevant to safeguards and work out operable solutions which may then 
be recommended to safeguards organizations for routine application. 
Three working groups have been functioning on a continuous basis. They are related to : 
Non-Destructive Methods 
Destructive Methods 
Isotopic Correlations and Reprocessing Input Accountancy 
The activities of these working groups are described in the following presentations by the 
convenors of the working groups. 
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THE ESARDA WORKING GROUP ON DESTRUCTIVE METHODS 
P. DE BIEVRE 
Central Bureau of Nuclear Measurements 
C. E. C. Joint Research Centre - GEEL (Belgium) 
Destructive measurements form the ultimate basis of any nuclear material accountancy by 
providing the basic values for the amounts of fissionable elements and isotopes in circulation. So 
far they also provide the characterization values of samples and materials used to calibrate non-
destructive assay. Ultimately, "declaration" values from nuclear plants and organizations as well 
as "verification" values obtained by Safeguard Authorities, are based on destructive measure-
ments by laboratories. 
There are therefore good reasons for a regular meeting opportunity of European Labora-
tories measuring fissionable material. Such a meeting forum has gradually come into being in the 
ESARDA Working Group on Destructive Methods. At this point in time (beginning 1978) more 
than 30 laboratories are represented in the Group including plant laboratories. They meet twice 
a year ( 1.5 - 2 days) on a laboratory site (Karlsruhe- Grenoble -Harwell -Berlin). This plenum is 
usually preceded by a one-day topical meeting where specialists treat their topic. 
Examples: 
- UF 6 isotopic measurements 
- UF 6 element assay 
- European laboratories participating in the US SALE Programme 
(§.afeguards Analytical Laboratory Evaluation) 
This flexible mode of organization minimizes travel cost and time, yet gives the opportu-
nity to both discuss highly specialized matters with colleagues in the field and meet during the 
plenum many others responsible for "measuring fissionable material". 
The Group has reviewed the IAEA Safeguards Technical Manual Part E Methods and Tech-
niques and transmitted a number of comments to the IAEA. 
As a forum it has discussed interlaboratory measurement evaluation programmes aiming at 
establishing the present state of the art of a given method or technique under realistic ope-
rational conditions 
attempting to establish a scientific basis for regarding differences between measurements 
from different laboratories as significant 
promoting improvement of precision, accuracy and reliability amongst laboratories measu-
ring fissionable material 
determining in a uniform manner for each laboratory the reproducibility of its measure-
ments 
allowing each participating laboratory to determine its bias. 
Examples of such interlaboratory programmes are AS-76 on the determination of 238pu 
abundance by the measurement of the 238puj239pu + 240pu activity ratio and IDA-78 on 
mass spectrometric isotope dilution measurements of uranium and plutonium in feed solutions of 
reprocessing plants. 
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One of the early achievements of the Group was to review the status of reference mate-
rials for safeguard measurements and discuss and approve projects for materials lacking in the 
field. It backed up requests for enriched 233u and 242pu spike isotopes for common use so 
that discrepancies between declaration and verification measurements would be minimized by the 
use of the same spike and recommended an improvement in the existing UF 6 Reference Materials 
(from 0.15 % to 0.05 % total uncertainty) on th~ basis of the very good precisions obtained in a 
UF6 interlaboratory test. 
As a result there are now available from the JRC-Geel (CBNM): 
233U spike solution (233U/U = 0.996- 1.0 mg/g) 
UF6 with 235U/U = 0.0044-0.0072-0.033 
And in the very near future 242pu spike solution (242Pu/Pu = 0.998 and 0.87 - 10 ~ g/g) 
244pu spike solution (244Pu/Pu = 0.98 - 1 ~g/g) 
23D-fh 
synthetic U/Pu input solution. 
A very important task recently started is the establishment of values of differences bet· 
ween measurements from laboratories to be regarded as significant. The first decisions are: 
0.2 % of value for 235u abundances in the range 0. 7 - 5 % 235u 
0.2 % of value for U element content determinations. 
Both are to be considered as "1977" values, i.e. generated in the year 1977. 
Common stands are also taken in some situations: the European laboratories participating 
in the US SALE Programme for example came to a unanimous request that, in view of the high 
percentage European participation in the programme ( ~ 12/35), more European involvement in 
the concept and organization of the programme was desirable. 
This opinion was formally submitted to the SALE Programme Management by representa-
tives. 
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THE ESARDA WORKING GROUP ON NON-DESTRUCTIVE METHODS 
AIMS: 
R.J.S. HARRY 
PETTEN - Netherlands 
The principal aim of the Working Group is to establish and recommend criteria to be used 
as a basis for agreement between plant operators and the Safeguards Authorities on the accepta-
bility of non-destructive measurements of nuclear fuel. Almost as important, but less easily ex-
pressed, is the aim of the participants to discuss the techniques they use or would like to use, the 
problems they have overcome or still face, and the accuracies and precision which they achieve or 
are required by management or Safeguarding Authority. On the basis of this exchange of infor-
mation it is possible to arrange bilateral or multilateral collaboration on topics of common inte-
rest. 
MEETINGS: 
The Working Group meets two times a year. Specialists of ESARDA-partners and an 
observer from IAEA participate in these regular sessions. In addition to the regular meetings, 
some informal meetings have been arranged on specific topics. These meetings have also been 
attended by experts from groups with appropriate experience, but which are not normally 
represented on the Working Group. In a meeting on Pu-containing waste with different plant 
operators a fruitful exchange of experience took place; however the large differences between 
the individual cases did not offer an opportunity for a common research effort of the group in 
the near future. 
At that meeting also the CEC Joint Research Centre plans for a central laboratory for the 
measurement of actinides contaminated waste were presented. Another topical meeting dealt 
with the gamma-spectrometric determination of Pu-isotopic composition, which resulted in a pro-
ject proposal. 
RESULTS: 
Compilation of reference material for NDA 
A list of standard reference materials within six countries of the EEC, the Commission and 
the IAEA is now ready for publication. It is intended to update the list at an appropriate time 
interval. A short ESARDA-report has been issued, but also the complete list can be obtained 
through the ESARDA secretariat. 
Compilation of methods 
The preparation of a list of NDA-methods in use, or to be used in the near future, for ac-
countancy and verification purposes is now nearly finished. It is foreseen that the report will be 
issued in 1978 as an ESARDA report. 
PROJECTS IN PROGRESS: 
Certified reference uranium-oxide for gamma-spectrometric determination of U-enrichment 
On the basis of the information contained in the reports mentioned above, it became clear 
that gamma-spectrometry is one of the most widely applied non-destructive techniques for U-
enrichment determination. Further the reference materials available were not suited for calibra-
tion of the technique, due to the small sizes or the status of the reference materials. 
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Therefore now a project has been started to prepare primary standard reference materials. 
Five enrichments have been selected between 0.3 %and 3.1 %. Of each enrichment, 100 samples 
of 200 g U30g will be prepared in specially designed aluminium containers. This is the first time 
that such a standard will have been prepared in the field of non-destructive analysis of nuclear 
material. 
In order to make the certified reference material acceptable to the safeguarding authorities, 
observers from Euratom and IAEA have been invited to be present at all key steps of the project. 
Collaboration with the United States of America, National Bureau of Standards, has been 
established for the preparation, characterization and certification of the material. The certifi-
cation will be performed by both the Commission and NBS. 
The project will be executed by members of the ESARDA Working Group of non-destruc-
tive methods together with staff members of NBS and the JRC-Geel (Central Bureau of Nuclear 
Measurements). 
Intercomparison of Pu-isotopic ratio determinations by gamma-spectrometry 
As a first step towards common actions in the field of NDA of Pu, the participants at the 
meeting on Pu-isotopic ratio measurements by gamma-spectrometry decided to start a small scale 
intercomparison exercise. 
Results of gamma-spectrometric determinations of the Pu-isotopic ratios are influenced by 
the following two classes of factors: 
quality of the measurement and data evaluation; 
gamma abundances and half-lives. 
In order to evaluate the accuracy of the gamma-spectrometric analysis one has to compare 
measurements on material with identical isotopic composition and to utilize the same set of nu-
clear data. It has been decided to utilize the NBS isotopic standards which are available in most 
laboratories, and to compare the results of gamma-spectrometry on the basis of one agreed set of 
nuclear data. About seven or eight laboratories intend to participate. It is expected that results 
can be received at the end of February 1978. These results will show what is the interlaboratory 
spread and if the gamma-spectrometry results are consistent, what is the systematic deviation 
from the certified isotopic composition of the standards. The comparable experimental results 
form a necessary basis for future evaluation discussions about this measurement method. 
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THE ESARDA WORKING GROUP ON ISOTOPIC CORRELATIONS AND 
REPROCESSING INPUT ACCOUNTANCY 
C. POGGI 
C.E.C. Joint Research Centre- ISPRA (Italy) 
One of the themes of collaboration among ESARDA partners has long been the 
"isotopic correlations" and the "reprocessing plant input analysis". 
A Working Group was therefore set up, with a view to promoting and coordina-
ting research work, exchanging information and providing reciprocal assistance in 
these fields. At present the Working Group is composed of representatives of the 
various member-organizations of ESARDA and some nuclear industries of the 
relevant countries. 
In 1977 the ESARDA Steering Committee decided to accept observers to the 
Working Group from the IAEA (Vienna) and BNWL (Richland-USA). 
What are "Isotopic Correlations" and "Reprocessing Plant Input Analysis" ? 
Nuclear fuels subjected to irradiation undergo a number of changes in their chemical and 
isotopic composition, such as bum-up of part of the fuel atoms initially present, build-up of ar-
tificial actinide nuclides, some of which are fissile, build-up of fission products. These changes, 
even if small in absolute, are extremely important since they result in an appreciable variation of 
the amount and type of fissile materials present in the fuel, and this is of relevance both to the 
economy of the industrial process and to the safeguarding of the fuel. The changes are very 
often correlated in a rather simple manner, the relationship being in some cases a simple straight 
line. These relationships are called "isotopic correlations". 
The concept of isotopic correlation can also be extended to other situations where the 
nuclear materials undergo changes in their isotopic composition: a typical example of such 
situations is the uranium enrichment process. 
Isotopic correlations in irradiated fuels find their most promising area of application as 
a supporting measure for nuclear material accountancy at the interface reactor-reprocessing of 
the fuel cycle. The correlations which are used for this purpose, are based on the amounts of 
various isotopes which are present in the irradiated fuel; these amounts are either correlated 
amongst one another or to the amounts which were present in the virgin fuel before irradiation in 
the reactor. The relationships thus obtained are used to check the results of the analytical 
measurements at the reprocessing plant input or the accuracy of the reactor operator estimates. 
Studies which are performed on isotopic correlations are either based on theoretical reac-
tor physics calculations or on experimental data. The experimental data are either obtained 
from post-irradiation experiments carried out on fuel assemblies or from analytical measurements 
performed on samples taken from the accountability tank of the reprocessing plant at the 
moment of dissolution of the fuel. 
The isotopic correlation techniques are already being applied by some reprocessing plant 
and reactor operators; safeguard applications are under development. 
The activity carried out by the Working Group can be illustrated by three typical examples 
of common projects. 
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The Isotope Correlation Experiment (ICE) 
The purpose of the ICE is to demonstrate the applicability of the isotope correlation 
technique to the safeguarding of fissile material at the imput of the reprocessing plant. 
The exferiment is being carried out on the occasion of the reprocessing, at the W AK 
plantO , of a batch of irradiated fuel elements discharged from the Obrigheim reactor(2). 
The reactor was bought from the KWU company(3). 
The decision to carry out the experiment was taken by the ESARDA Working Group on 
Isotope Correlations in 1976. 
In the framework of this experiment, 5 fuel elements have been dissolved during the 
month of January 1978; the isotopic composition of the samples taken at the tank are 
being measured by W AK, KfK - Karlsruhe, Euratom Safeguards and IAEA Safeguards. 
In addition, some special analyses will be performed, namely: hull monitoring by KfK 
laboratories, isotopic composition of fission gases, analysis of minor actinide isotopes 
and burn-up measurement by the JRC-Karlsruhe laboratories, calibration of accountancy 
tank by GfK and the JRC-Ispra. 
The experimental data produced by WAK, JRC and KfK within the framework of the 
ICE will be made available to the participants. It is expected that the first results will 
be distributed to the participants in April-May of this year. The post-experimental 
phase will be planned in detail later. A comprehensive ICE-report will be issued after the 
completion of the experiment; the report will include the description of the experiment, 
the results obtained, the analysis of the results and the conclusions. 
The Data Bank of Isotopic Compositions 
Although the fields of application for the correlation techniques have been singled-out 
and exploitation has already started, further experimental effort and theoretical inter-
pretation are needed to improve confidence in the technique. In this respect, ESARDA 
has taken the initiative of collecting, on a European scale, data on fuel isotopic compo-
sition generated during a number of reprocessing campaigns or post-irradiation fuel ana-
lyses. 
The task of gathering these data into a Data Bank was entrusted to the JRC-Ispra. The 
work for the preparation of the Bank was started in 1976, and was developed in three dif-
ferent steps. First, the Data Bank developed at the Karlsruhe Establishment of the JRC 
was transferred to Ispra; then the software was replaced by a new one operating under 
the supervision of the IBM Data Management System STAIRS, and the data format trans-
formed and improved; the third step, now in course, transfers the control of the Bank 
from the STAIRS System to the ADABAS System, which is more suitable for the treat-
ment of scientific data. At present, the Bank is operational, and the exchange of the 
control system will not interfere with its workability. 
(1) WAK : Gesellschaft zur Wiederaufarbeitung von Kernbrennstoffen, Leopoldshafen 
(2) The Obrigheim Station is equipped with a pressurized water reactor, and is owned by 
Kernkraftwerk Obrigheim GmbH (KWO) 
(3) KWU : Kraftwerk Union A.G., Frankfurt. 
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The unit of information stored in the Bank is the DOCUMENT. A document contains 
all the results of the measurements performed on: 
-one single pellet, or 
-one sample taken at the accountancy tank of the reprocessing plant. 
The document also contains additional information for the complete identification of the 
fuel analysed, the reactor from which the fuel has been discharged, the laboratories invol-
ved in the analysis, etc. 
At present, 260 documents are stored in the Bank; 130 of them refer to dissolver solu-
tion samples taken during the reprocessing of fuels discharged from the reactors at 
Garigliano (BWR), Trino Vercellese (PWR), Windscale (AGR), Sena (PWR), Dodewaard 
(BWR); the other 130 refer to pellet samples measured in post-irradiation experiments 
performed on fuels discharged from the reactors at Garigliano, Kahl (BWR), Trino Ver-
cellese, Dodewaard, Tokai-Mura (BWR). Contacts with the Battelle Northwest Labora-
tories are in course, to obtain the data stored in their Bank. 
The data which may be reported in a document are: the total amount of uranium, pluto-
nium and thorium (whichever applicable) in the fresh and irradiated fuel, together with 
their isotopic composition; fuel burn-up; amount of curium and americium present in the 
irradiated fuel; selected ratios of krypton, xenon, neodymium, cesium and europium 
isotopes; measurement errors for all the data reported and calculated data. · 
The statistical evaluation of the data is performed by the CORRELATIO programme, 
developed by the ECN Petten, and is based on straight line fitting which takes into 
account errors in both X- andY-directions. 
The Symposium on the Isotopic Correlation 
It has already been pointed out that the isotopic correlation techniques (ICT) are emer-
ging as an important supporting measure for the accountancy and control of nuclear 
materials which pass through commercial fuel cycle facilities for the production of 
nuclear energy. 
Research in the field of ICTs and their applications is being carried out at many labora-
tories and research centres in Europe, USA, Japan; there is indication that also labora-
tories in the Eastern Countries, Pakistan, India, Brazil, are interested in the ICTs. 
An empirical use of ICT is already being made by reprocessing plant operators (mainly for 
consistency checks of input measurements) and by some reactor operators (for verifica-
tion of the burn-up and the plutonium and uranium content of the irradiated fuel). 
Similar uses may probably be made by the safeguards authorities in the near future. 
All these reasons led the ESARDA Steering Committee to take the decision to sponsor a 
Symposium on "The Isotopic Correlation and its Application to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle", 
to be held at Stresa (Italy) on May 9-11, 1978. The scope of the Symposium is to sum-
marize the experience gained from past applications, to present new basic data, to inform 
potential users, and to highlight any areas where additional work may be required. 
The symposium will be chaired by Dr. S. Finzi, Chairman of ESARDA and Director of 
the Applied Science and Technology Department at the lspra Establishment (Joint 
Research Centre of the Commission of the European Communities). The lspra Establish-
ment is responsible for the organization of the Symposium. 
30 Papers will be presented, dealing with the following subjects: theoretical interpreta-
tion of isotopic correlations in irradiated fuels, experimental results obtained on various 
fuel types, application of isotopic correlations to the safeguarding and management of 
nuclear materials. A panel discussion will close the Symposium. 
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